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The Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict on
Southeastern Europe
MARK S. ELLIS*

I. Introduction
During the initial stage of the Kosovo crisis, the international community held out promises of substantial support to neighboring countries if they stood strong against Serbian

aggression. President Clinton spoke about launching a Marshall Plan for Southeastern Europe to help rebuild a region crippled by war.' NATO leaders showered promises of military
protection and economic help to Yugoslavia's neighbors for siding with the alliance on
Kosovo. In fact, NATO's "direct and real interest" in the security of the neighboring countries caused the alliance to be at "the forefront of the international community in supplying
money and material" to these countries.2 To prevent any widening of the conflict, neighboring countries received security support from both the international community and
NATO. Indeed, the NATO alliance did not hesitate to assure the neighboring countries
that it would stand by them throughout the crisis, given their importance to NATO's overall
efforts to stabilize the region.' Did the international community keep its promise? Did the
region pay an extraordinary price for assisting the alliance in its actions against Belgrade?
Can the region fully recover from the Kosovo crisis?
This article offers a preliminary assessment of the effects of the Kosovo war on Southeastern Europe and addresses regional reconstruction efforts up to and including the recently adopted Stability Pact. Much can be established empirically. For instance, economic
performance before and after the war can be measured with relative accuracy. One can also
count the number of refugees fleeing Kosovo and assess the economic and infrastructural

*Mark Ellis is the executive director of the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law
Initiative (CEELI). He is also the legal advisor to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone and Carl Tham. The author would like to express his appreciation to
Andy Winternitz for his invaluable research for this article and to Patsy Palmer for her significant guidance in
structuring and editing this article. As always, Laurie Brumburg provided superb editing skills to the article.
1. President Bill Clinton, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (May 13, 1999), available at http://
www.usis.it/file9905/alia/99051405.htm.
2. Id.
3. Ben Partridge, NATO Worries About Effect on Neighboring Countries (Mar. 31, 1999), available at http://
www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/03/F.RU.990331132001 .html.
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burden this imposed on host countries. This articles also attempts to discern some of the
trends leading up to the war, including the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the early
warnings of the Kosovo crisis, and the initial response from the international community
to the crisis.
When discussing Southeastern Europe,4 it is important to note that it is a heterogeneous
region whose combined population of fifty-six million equals just eighty-four percent of
the population of Central Europe5 and fifteen percent of the European Union.6 Romania,
with a population of twenty-two million, is the region's largest and most populous nation
and is ten times the size of Macedonia,7 the region's least populous nation. Per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) ranges from $760 for Albania to $5,100 for Croatia.' Its one
homogeneous characteristic has been a decade of conflict. Southeastern Europe's confused
and dismembered past recorded another chapter with the intervention of NATO during
the Kosovo crisis.
II. Early Warnings
During the tumultuous decade of the 1990s, the situation building in Kosovo was largely
overshadowed by developments elsewhere in the former YugoslaviaY While the 1995 Dayton Accords were successful in resolving the Bosnian conflict, they were flawed by the fact
that Kosovo was deliberately left off the negotiation agenda. Western powers and the
United Nations essentially ignored the Kosovo problem, even though Balkan leaders and
international organizations forewarned of Serbia's oppressive actions against Kosovo and
growing regional instability. Because the Dayton agreement created an ethnically divided
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a Muslim/Croat Federation and the Serb-led Republic of Srpska
within Bosnia's previously recognized border, expectations were heightened among Kosovar
Albanians for some degree of independence from Serbia.' 0 Perhaps more importantly, the
failure to improve Kosovo's situation at Dayton likely signaled to Kosovo's leaders that a
continued effort to gain international support while opposing the Belgrade regime nonviolently would be fruitless.I
Under the 1974 Constitution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a
significant devolution of power occurred, shifting authority away from the central govern-

4. For purposes of this paper, Southeastern Europe includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The autonomous
province of Kosovo is located in the southern part of the Republic of Serbia and is a constituent of the FRY.
The Republic of Montenegro, also a constituent of the FRY, borders Kosovo on the north and northwest.
5. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic.

6.

WORLD BANK, EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION, THE

ROAD TO STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN SOUTH

EASTERN EUROPE A REGIONAL STRATEGY PAPER 10 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/
abshtml/14725.htin [hereinafter ROAD TO STABILITY].

7. Id.
8. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTROOK ONLINE 1999 (1999), at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/index.html; IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORT, ALBANIA: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2000
ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE SECOND ANNUAL ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE
POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY 15 (2000) [hereinafter ALBANIASTAPP REPORT].

9. Kosovo-The Start of a New Balkan War?, at http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/guides/surveys/
kosowo.htm (last visited June 21, 2000).
10. LEO TINDEMANS ET AL., UNFINISHED PEACE-

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BAL-

RANS
117 (1996).
11. Discussions between the author and Kosovar Albanians during a 1997 trip to the region.
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ment in Belgrade to the six constituent republics of the country' 2 Within Serbia, Kosovo
was given substantial autonomy, including oversight of its educational system, judiciary, and
police. Albanian became the official language of the province. Kosovo also was given its
own provincial assembly. Prior to the Kosovo crisis, the population of Kosovo was between
1.8 million and 2.1 million, of which roughly eighty-five to ninety percent were Kosovar
Albanians. 1"
In April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, who was then-Chairman of the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, traveled to Kosovo. On June
28, 1989, in a speech before a crowd of over one million local Serbs, at the 600th anniversary
of the Ottoman-Serbian Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic set forth a Serbian nationalist agenda
for Kosovo.
By the end of 1989, anti-Kosovo rhetoric from Belgrade reached a new high. Earlier that
year, the Serbian Assembly debated a series of amendments to the Constitution of Serbia
stripping Kosovo of its autonomous status. On May 8, 1989, the Assembly approved the
constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution. Belgrade then pursued a set of harsh and repressive policies in Kosovo while
making it clear that it would never "give up" this province populated largely by ethnic
Albanians. 4 Repressive policies continued with such acts as the dismissal of tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians from all professions, the introduction of a unified education
system that excluded instruction in the Albanian language beyond elementary school, and
the closing of the Albanian-dominated University of Pristina as well as Albanian language
media. High-ranking Kosovar Albanian political figures were replaced with supporters of
Milosevic. Albanian political organizations as well as cultural and sports associations were
banned.'" New laws were passed that same year, making it a crime for ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo to buy or sell property without permission from Belgrade.16
A year later, in July 1990, this same Serbian Assembly suspended the Assembly of Kosovo
after 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates from that Assembly declared Kosovo an
equal and independent entity within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In September 1991, Kosovar Albanians held a referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for
independence.
Massive police violence initiated by Belgrade became commonplace in Kosovo, including
arbitrary arrests, custodial torture, and denials and violations of the rights of Kosovar Albanians. Political show trials were prevalent, in which ethnic Albanian police officers were

12. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.
13. Indictment Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-99-37 (1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/
mil-ii990524e.htm [hereinafter Milosevic].
14. In 1996, Rump Yugoslavia President Zoran Lolic stated, "Albanians [are] contaminated by separation
[and] should give up this crazy idea since Kosovo will never secede from Serbia." Open Media Research Institute
(OMRI) Daily Digest, Rump Yugoslav President in Kosovo (Feb. 15, 1996), at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
1996/02/4-SEE/see%2D150296.html. Speaking to a crowd of Serbs in Kosovo, then Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic said Belgrade would never give up the majority ethnic Albanian region. Serbia: MilosevicSays
Belgrade Will Never Give Up on Kosovo, RFE/RL NEWSLINE (June 25, 1997), at http://www.rferl.org/nca/news/
1997/06/N.RU.970625152407.html.
15. Discussions with Kosovo Albanian colleagues; RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 39, October 1,
1993.
16. SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT, FOURTH REPORT T 18 1999,
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cml 99900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2807.htm.
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placed on trial and sentenced to prison. Kosovar Albanians lived an "underground existence. "'7

Yet Belgrade's increasingly oppressive policies against Kosovo and Kosovar Albanians did
not go unnoticed. Early on, many observers predicted that Belgrade's ongoing assault on
Kosovo would develop into an all-out war.'8
Ill. Initial Reaction from the International Community
One of the earliest international organizations to focus on the potential crisis in Kosovo
was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) [now the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)]. In its meetings in 1991, the CSCE
aggressively criticized Serbia for its oppressive policies toward Kosovo.' 9 In 1992, the CSCE
reported on "the grave situation of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and the denial of fundamental freedoms to them." ° By 1993, the CSCE was calling for "immediate preventive
action" by the international community in Kosovo." By 1997, the OSCE was becoming
more aggressive in its criticism towards Belgrade's actions in Kosovo. Foreign Minister
Max van der Stoel as Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for Kosovo issued
his first pubic statement: "The brutal way in which the police dispersed a peaceful student
demonstration in Kosovo yesterday gives rise to deep concern. The police actions have led
to a further escalation of tensions, which could have been avoided."22
The United Nations began monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo in 1992.23
In 1993, when the CSCE was forced out of the FRY, the U.N. Security Council adopted
a resolution calling for the return of the CSCE to Pristina.14 In 1997, the U.N. General
Assembly expressed concerns "about all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, in particular the repression of the ethnic Albanian population and discrimination against it."2 In January 1998, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
26
Mary Robinson, reiterated her deep concern on the recent increase of violence in Kosovo.
Later, she expressed her exasperation with the situation in Kosovo by stating, "[w]e keep
talking, both at the U.N. and at the international level, about lessons learned-but we don't
27
learn the lessons!"

17. Robin Cook, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Statements Before the
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Question 479 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/man/
dod-101/ops/2000/2802/0031613.htm [hereinafter Cook Statement].
18. The summit meeting of the Balkan leaders held on Crete on November 3-4, 1997, as reported by
RFE/RL PRACUE (Nov. 6, 1997), available at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/11/061197.html.
19. On the State of Affairs in Kosovo and Metobija, CSCE/91-07-A.doc/3.
20. Eleventh CSO Meeting, Helsinki, May 18-21, 1992.
21. The Challenges of Change, CSCE Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992.
22. Max van der Stoel, Statement at The Hague (Dec. 31, 1997).
23. See G.A. Res. 111, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RFS/51/111 (1997); G.A. Res. 190, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/190 (1995); G.A. Res. 204, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/204 (1994); G.A. Res. 18, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/18 (1993); and GA. Res.
147, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/147 (1992).
24. S.C. Res. 855, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/855 (1993).
25. G.A. Res. 139, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/RES/52/139 (1997).
26. Kosovo Daily Report #1365, UN Human Rights Chief Urges Action on Kosovo (Mar. 8, 1998), at http://
www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/1998/98-03-08.ksv.html.
27. Id.
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On March 31, 1998, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1160, imposing an
arms embargo on both the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and calling for
autonomy with "meaningful self administration."" On September 23, 1998, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1199, which called for Yugoslav Forces to be withdrawn from
Kosovo.29 On October 24, 1998, the Council passed Resolution 1203, which affirmed support for OSCE-Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCE-KVM) deployment and Yugoslav
troop withdrawals.3 0 On November 17, 1998, Resolution 1207 was passed, which demanded
that Yugoslavia comply with the requests of the International Criminal Tribunal of the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), including the arrest of several individuals indicted for war
crimes 3 ' during the Bosnian conflict.
Throughout this early period, the Council of Europe was an important voice for states
in the region, each of which, except Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a Council member. In 1996,
the Council's Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1077, which deplored "the ethnic persecution and discrimination, which appear to be directed mainly at those Kosovar
Albanians engaged in passive resistance to the Serb authorities."32 The resolution noted
that approximately 340,700 Kosovar Albanians had sought asylum in several Council of
Europe member states. 3 By January 1998, the Council was warning of a potential catastrophe caused by Belgrade's continued repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The stability of the entire Balkan region was at risk. The Council again condemned Belgrade's
actions and called for the immediate restoration of human rights and freedoms for the
34
Kosovar Albanians.
In September 1997, the Contact Group 5 called for dialogue between the Kosovo resistance and the Belgrade government and voiced concern over the violence in Kosovo.3 6 On
March 9, 1998, in response to the Drenica massacre, the Group called for stronger measures, including implementation of an arms embargo against FRY and a ban on transfers
of equipment that could be used for suppressing the Kosovar Albanians.3 7 The Group's
statement formed the basis of Security Council Resolution 1160. By April 1998, the Contact
Group put into effect a freeze on FRY funds held abroad.3"
The United States took a particularly aggressive position regarding Kosovo. After a visit
to Kosovo in 1991, then-Senator Robert Dole pushed for the creation of a U.S. Information

28. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1160 (1998).
29. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1199 (1998).
30. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1203 (1998).
31. S.C. Res. 1207, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1207 (1998).
32. On Albanian Asylum-Seekersftom Kosovo, Resolution 1077, EUR. PARL. Ass., $ 2 (Jan. 24, 1996), at
http://www.stars.coe.fr/ta/ta996/ERES1077.htm.
33. Id. $ 3.
34. Recent Developments in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and Their Implicationsfor the Balkan Region, Resolution 1146, EUR. PARL. Ass. (Jan. 29, 1998), at http://www.stars.coe.fr/ta/ta98/ERES1146.htn.
35. The Contact Group, initially constituted to deal with Bosnia, was composed of the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group played an increasingly important role as the crisis developed.
36. See OFFICE

OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, BOSNIA

CONTACT GROUP

STATEMENT

ONKosovo (Sept. 24,

1997), at http://www.ohr.int/docu/d9709044.htm.
37. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, LONDON CONTACT GROUP MEETING STATEMENT ON Kosovo
(Mar. 9, 1998), at http://secretary.state.gov/www/travels/980309-kosovo.html.
38. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, CONTACT GROUP JOINT STATEMENT: Kosovo $ 8 (June 12,
1998), at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm980612-2.htm.
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Agency (USID) office in Pristina. He described Kosovo as a "tinderbox." On December
27, 1992, reports of a crackdown by Belgrade against Kosovo resulted in then-President
George Bush's "Christmas Warning" to Milosevic threatening unilateral air strikes against
Serbia if Belgrade proceeded with its plans. Madeleine Albright, then-U.S. representative
to the United Nations, reiterated this warning to the U.N. Security Council on August 9,
1993: "President Bush's message was specific and clear: we are prepared to respond against
Serbia in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action." 9 On July 11, 1995,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill preventing the lifting of sanctions against
Belgrade until the excessive Serbian control over Kosovo ended. 4°
As early as 1992, the European Union publicly expressed its concern over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. In its Lisbon Declaration, the European Council stated: "[w]ith
regard to Kosovo, the European Council expects the Serbian leadership to refrain from
further repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of this territory."41
In a more aggressive statement, the Council affirmed in December 1992 that "[t]he autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia must be restored. ' '42Because of Belgrade's continued oppressive policies against Kosovo, the Council, in 1995, called upon the FRY to grant "ex43
tensive autonomy" to Kosovo.
Meanwhile, the European Parliament included Kosovo on its agenda as early as 1990. In
1992, the Parliament issued a statement expressing concern over the human rights situation
in Kosovo. 44 An even stronger statement was issued on June 11, 1992, when the Parliament
stated that "the continuing oppression of the Albanian population of Kosovo is unacceptable
and constitutes an obstacle to normal relations between Serbia and the [EU]J.'4 On March
13, 1997, the Parliament issued a statement "[c]ondemn[ing] the continuous repression in
Kosovo, [and] urg[ing] the Serbian authorities to release all political prisoners, to guarantee
the freedom of the media, and to start negotiations with representatives of the people of
Kosovo on the future of the region." 6 As with other organizations, the Parliament reacted
swiftly to Serbia's actions against nonviolent demonstrations in Pristina in October 1997
by condemning "the violent actions of the Serbian police force against peaceful demon47
strations in the Kosovo region.
By early 1998, the international media-including The New York Times, The Washington
Post, The Chicago Tribune, The FinancialTimes, Le Figaro,La Stampa, Aktuert, The Scotsman,
Le Monde, and FrankfurterAllgemeine-were also predicting dire consequences for neighboring states, which soon would be engulfed by the fallout. 4 s In January 1998, The Economist
depicted Kosovo as "the grimmest spot in Europe, the crucible, some fear, of its next war."49
39. U.N. SCOR, 50th Session, 3662d mtg. at 1,U.N. Doc. S/PV.3662 (1993).
40. H.R. 1868, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
41.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, BULLETIN

EC 6-1992, 1.32.

42.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, BULLETIN

EC 12-1992, 1.85.

43. EUROPEAN COUNCIL REPORT ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 1995, BULLETIN
EU, 7/8-1996, 2.2.1.
44. European Parliament Resolution on Kosovo, 1990 Oj. (C 284) 129.
45. European Parliament Resolution on Relations Between the European Communities and the Republics
of the Former Yugoslavia, 1992 OJ. (C 176) 199.
46. European Parliament Resolution on Kosovo, 1997 Oj. (C 115) 170.
47. European Parliament Resolution on Kosovo, 1997 Oj. (C 339) 157.
48. See Joel Blocker et al., Commentators Warn of Dangers ofKosovo, WESTERN PRESS REVIEW (Mar. 9, 1998),
athttp://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/03/F.RU.980309132833.hnl.
49. Europe's Roughest Neighborhood,THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1998, at 3.
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Some Balkan leaders, in particular then-President-Elect Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, also warned of a looming catastrophe. Djukanovic pointedly charged Belgrade with
failure to promote democratization in Kosovo,5° stating that Kosovo had long been subject
to a repressive police regime controlled by Belgrade, and should therefore receive a "certain
degree of autonomy.""1 By 1998, then-President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia was predicting that Kosovo was on the way toward outright war and that the conflict was certain to
affect the stability of Macedonia.52 Already he was predicting the possible influx of up to
400,000 refugees, 3 and starting to plan for a corridor through Macedonian territory
4
to enable fleeing Kosovar Albanians to reach Albania when war erupted1
NATO broke its silence on Kosovo in late 1997 when it publicly declared: "We confirm
that NATO's interest in stability extends beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to the surrounding region. We share.., concerns... [about] the escalating ethnic tensions in Kosovo and
other areas.""
On March 5, 1998, NATO issued another stern warning regarding the violence in Kosovo
saying that, "[t]he North Atlantic Council is profoundly concerned by the violent incidents
which took place in Kosovo the last few days, and in particular the Serbian police's brutal
6
suppression of a peaceful demonstration in Pristina on 2nd March 1998."1
Numerous international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) recognized early that
resolving the "Kosovo problem" was a keystone to peace and security in Southeastern
Europe. 57 They predicted that any delay in resolving the escalating crisis in Kosovo would
lead to a full-scale war."8
As early as November 1993, there were warnings from the NGO community of the type
of scenario that played out in Kosovo during 1999. In April 1993, the Minnesota Advocates
for Human Rights called upon the U.N. Security Council to provide resources " ... necessary to document and report on human rights abuses [in Kosovo]." 9 In that same year
the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center started an active program to monitor the
human rights situation in Kosovo. 60 In 1995, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations called
police refor the immediate ending of "violations of human rights in Kosovo, including
61
pression, detention of political prisoners, and confiscation of passports.
50. See Renate Flottau, Es HerrchtAngst, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 20, 2000, at 154.
51. Montenegro Calls for Kosovo Autonomy, RFE/RI NEWSLINE, Feb. 25, 1998, at http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/1998/02/2 50298.html.
52. See Gligorov Warns on Kosovo, RFE/RL NEWSLINE,Jan. 22, 1998, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/
01/220198.html.
53. See Memorandum to Mark Ellis from Ljubica Z. Acevska, Macedonian Ambassador to the United States
(Dec. 20, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Acevska Memo].
54. See id.
55. Final Communiqui ofthe MinisterialMeeting oftthe North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters,
NATO Press Release M-NAC-2 (97) 155, (Dec. 16, 1997), at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/
p97-155e.htm.
56. Council Statement on the Situation in Kosovo, NATO Press Release (98) 29, (Mar. 5, 1998).
57. ASPEN INSTITUTE BERLIN, INTERNATIONAL CALL FOR ACTION STUDY GROUP: THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS
63(1998).
58. See id.
59. MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MINNESOTA PLAN: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN Kosovo (1993).
60. Discussion with Nataga Kandic, Director of the Humanitarian Law Center.
61. CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION, TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE: CONFLICT
PREVENTION IN THE SOUTH BALKANS(Barnett R. Rubin ed.) (1996).
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In 1996, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predicted that the "present
dynamics [in Kosovo] point to the violent breakup of rump-Yugoslavia."6 A report prepared
by the European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans stated that "[nieglecting a resolution of the Kosovo crisis dangerously risks a conflagration that might spread beyond
Kosovo's borders. Escalation of the crisis could have severe consequences for regional and
European security and stability."63 The report urged a "strong and united" action by the
international community to take place as a process that would lead to a peaceful and permanent settlement of the crisis.Allegations of atrocities committed against the Kosovar Albanians began to appear in
1993. "The Kosovo Albanians now suffer severe repression and maltreatment by Serbian
security forces, with systematic human rights violations, intimidation, and police terror
occurring on a daily basis.16 Also issued were statements warning that the spread of the
crisis to other countries would precipitate a refugee crisis that would "tax the resources of
Western Europe" and "could therefore have severe consequences for regional and European
66
security and stability."
During this period, the International Crisis Group was accounting for atrocities com67
mitted in Kosovo and issuing strong warnings to the international community.
In 1998, the Aspen Institute called for the immediate restoration of full civil, political,
and human rights of the Kosovar Albanians.61
Human Rights Watch warned of human rights violations in Kosovo in separate reports
in 1993,69 1994,10 1996, 11and 1998. 72InJanuary 1998, the International Helsinki Federation
for Human Rights released a statement, reporting on the numerous stories of "preparations
by Serbian military and police forces . . .apparently aimed at intimidating the Albanian
population, and in preparation for a large-scale military crackdown."" Additionally, the
report warned that the "[nlotorious Serb paramilitary leader 'Arkan' "was observed in the
74
area and that Serb citizens were being armed.

62. TINDEMANS,supra note 10, at 117.
63. EUROPEAN ACTION COUNCIL FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS, Kosovo: FROM CRISIS TO A PERMANENT SOLUTION (1997), at http://www.ceip.org/programs/law/kosovo.htm [hereinafter EUROPEAN ACTION].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. "[O]f the 2,263 cases of 'human rights violations' in the period from July to September 1997, they cite
three murders, three 'discriminations based on language', and 149 'routine checkings.' By collating minor and
major offences under the same headings, the statistics fail to give a fair representation of the situation." INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Kosovo SPRING REPORT (1998).
68. See ASPEN INSTITUTE BERLIN, supra note 57.

69.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OPEN WOUNDS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSESIN

Kosovo (1993).

70. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSESOF NON-SERBS IN Kosovo, SANDZA, AND VOJVODINA
(1994).
71. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN Kosovo (1996).
72. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS IN Kosovo
(1998); seealso HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: DETENTIONS AND ABUSE IN Kosovo
(1998).
73. INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Kosovo: URGENT APPEAL FOR COURAGE,
LEADERSHIP, AND COOPERATION (1998), available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/appeals/980121 .htm.
74. Id.
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V. Effects of the Kosovo Crisis on Southeastern Europe
A.

THE REFUGEE CRISIS

The flight of refugees out of Kosovo resulted from escalated violence in the region that
began a full year before the NATO military campaign. Human rights violations, and not
NATO bombing, caused the mass exodus from Kosovo." The vast majority of refugees had
been systematically and forcibly displaced from municipalities throughout Kosovo by Serbian police and paramilitary groups.7 6 As early as 1998, forces of the FRY initiated a campaign of terror against Kosovar Albanians, shelling towns and villages, destroying property,
and forcibly expelling Kosovar Albanians from certain areas. The United Nations estimates
that by mid-October 1998, almost 300,000 persons (nearly eighteen percent of the population) had been internally displaced within Kosovo or had left the province." By March
23, 1999, there were already 210,000 displaced persons inside Kosovo, driven to the mountains and forests by the Serb offensive;"8 more than 70,000 refugees had fled to safety in
neighboring countries. 9
Based on a survey of Kosovar Albanian refugees conducted in Albania and Macedonia
between April 19 and May 3, 1999, Physicians for Human Rights concluded that the refugees fled Kosovo for two reasons: (1) they were forcibly expelled by Yugoslav military or
paramilitary forces, or (2) they were afraid of these same military forces.66 Not one of the
1,180 refugees interviewed stated that they fled because of NATO bombing."' Other major
NGOs similarly concluded that the overwhelming majority of Kosovar Albanian refugees
were forced from their homes, villages, and towns by Serbian military or paramilitary
forces."l
All in all, between March 23 and June 9, 1999, approximately 863,000 Kosovar Albanians
were forcefully expelled from Kosovo. 3 They represented forty-four percent of the total
population of Kosovo (1,956,000) and fifty-four percent of the Kosovo Albanian population
(1,603,920).B4 The vast majority of these refugees-783,000-found sanctuary in neigh-

75. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FORHUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OFTHE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN Kosovo, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OFYUGOSLAVIA, $ 7

(1999) [hereinafter UNHCHR REPORT].
76. Id. $ 9.
77. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPreparedPursuant toResolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998)
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 1 20 U.N. Doc. S/1998/1068 (1998).
78. Cook Statement, supra note 17, at question 384.
79. Id.
80. PHYSICIANS FORHUMAN RIGHTS, WAR CRIMES IN Kosovo:

A POPULATION-BASED

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST KOSOVAR ALBANIANS (1999).
81. Id. See also UNFICHR REPORT, supra note 75, %7 ("Out of 273

ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN

refugees interviewed, only 1 reportedly

left his village out of fear of NATO bombs.").
82. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A VILLAGE DESTROYED: WAR CRIMES IN Kosovo (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN THE GLOGOVAC MUNICIPALITY (1999); see also ORGANIZATION FORSECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Kosovo/KoSOvA: As SEEN,ASTOLD, AN ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FINDINGS OF THE OSCE Kosovo VERIFICATION MISSION (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/

reports/hr/partl/index.htm [hereinafter OSCE REPORT].
83. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
FORTHE COUNTRIES OFSOUTH EASTERN
EUROPEIN THE AFTERMATH OF THE Kosovo CRISIS (1999) [hereinafter IMF REPORT SEPT. 19991.

84. Id.
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boring countries,85 primarily in Albania and Macedonia. Despite the fact that these countries
were relatively poor and undergoing economic reform, 6 they faced the added burden of
supporting vast refugee populations. The influx of these new arrivals put tremendous strain
on these countries' economies and infrastructure while threatening further political destabilization in the region." Although the international community covered the bulk of the
cost of humanitarian aid, significant expenditures by these neighboring countries placed
additional pressure on their already weak fiscal structures."
When NATO air strikes began on March 24, 1999, the magnitude of the refugee crisis
grew at a staggering rate, overwhelming both the international community and the neighboring countries.8 9 While it has been firmly established that human rights abuses, not
NATO bombing, caused the mass exodus, none of the major Western European countries
anticipated the scale of displacement.
As one ambassador stated, "The response to the crisis was simply too little and too late. '"9°
None of the major Western European countries anticipated the scale of displacement. 9I
Still if the West had foreseen that a half-million people would pour out of Kosovo, it is
unlikely that neighboring countries would have been up to the task of providing shelter92
In fact, the numbers were so large during the first two weeks of the exodus that the neighboring countries were left stunned and struggling to cope.
Regionally, the refugee crisis had a particularly debilitating effect on Albania and Macedonia. These two countries bore the brunt of the exodus, managing total refugee populations of more than 700,000 at the height of the crisis. 93 Bosnia-Herzegovina had a total
influx of over 105,000 refugees from both Kosovo and the FRY.94 Other countries in the
region were generally spared the burden of sheltering large numbers of refugees. For instance, Bulgaria officially registered 317 refugees who were granted temporary (six months)
asylumY5 Croatia accepted 2,300 refugees, of which 1,200 were ethnic Albanians.96 Expenditures in Croatia "for refugees and others affected by civil war," as a percent of GDP,
decreased from 0.7 percent in 1998 to 0.4 percent in 1999. 97
85. Id.
86. See IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra
note 83; Acevska Memo, supra note 53; see also EMERGENCY MANKosovo REFUGEE EMERGENCY: EMG PLAN FOR COORDINATION (1999), available at http://mininf.gov.al/english/Kosovo/speciale/info/9907/REHAB3 1.html [hereinafter EMG PLAN].
87. Acevska Memo, supra note 53.
AGEMENT GROUP, REHABILITATION OF IMPACTS OF THE

88. See

EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSITION REPORT

[hereinafter EBRD

89. See UNITED

1999, 83 (1999)

REPORT].

NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES,

UNHCR EVALUATION

AND POLICY ANALYSIS-

THE Kosovo REFUGEE CRISIS 9J29 (2000) [hereinafter UNHCR EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS].

90. Comment by Macedonian Ambassador to the United States, Ljubica Z. Acevska to the author.
91. See Cook Statement, supra note 17, at question 386.
92. Id.
93. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE RED CROSS, CRISIS IN THE BALKANS SITUATION REPORT No. 42,
available at http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacfdf48ca698b64l256242003b3295/ecObdcl546181e694125679

000452998 (last modified Aug. 7, 1999).
94. See UNHCR, 1999 MID-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT-BoSNIA-HEREGOVINA, at http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/
my99/bih.htm (last visited July 7, 2000).
95. See KRASSEN STANCHEV, YUGOSLAV WAR ECONOMIC IMPACTS: BULGARIA3 (1999) [hereinafter STANCHEV
REPORTI.

96. See UNHCR, 1999 MID-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT-CROATIA, at http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/my99/hrv.htm
(last visited July 7, 2000).
97. IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORT, REPUBLIC OF CROATIA: SELECTED ISSUES AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX 24
(2000) [hereinafter CROATIA STAFF REPORT].
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For Albania, the influx of refugees was the most significant and immediate consequence
of the conflict. The flow of refugees commenced in the third week of March and steadily
increased through June 1999.98 In the first phase of mass exodus from Kosovo (March 24
through April 6, 1999), refugees came by way of three main Albanian border crossings:
Trepoja, Krune, and Morina. A total of 236,000 refugees filed into Albania during this
time. 99 It is not surprising that most of the refugees into Albania came from those Kosovo
municipalities nearest to the Kosovo/Albanian border: Pec, Decani, Djakovica, Orahovac,
Suva Reka, Prizren, and Gora. 1°°
During the second phase of mass exodus (April 7 throtigh April 23, 1999), refugees
entered Albania primarily through the Kosovo/Albanian border crossing at Morina. l5 l By
June 1999, the number of Kosovo refugees in Albania reached 444,200,102 the equivalent
of fourteen percent of Albania's own population.
From the start of the conflict, Albania maintained an open-door policy toward the Kosovar refugees. Yet the massive number of refugees admitted strained public services, diminished supplies, and put pressure on facilities used to house and service them, causing
significant damage to the country's infrastructure. 1°3 Of the Kosovar refugees in Albania,
300,000 were put up by families, 83,000 lived in tented camps, and 95,000 lived in collective
centers throughout the country. 1°4
Macedonia followed a similar pattern, with almost 250,000 refugees flooding into the
country between March 23 and June 9, 1999.105 The number of refugees in Macedonia was
approximately eighteen percent of the country's total population.
In addition to the economic strain it imposed, the influx of Kosovar Albanians threatened
to upset Macedonia's already tense balance of ethnic Slavs and ethic Albanians, and thus
raised serious questions about national security and stability. 10 6 The crisis began shortly
after a new government had been formed in Skopje, which included extreme nationalist
elements among both ethnic groups. To compound the situation, it was unclear whether
the refugees would be able to return to Kosovo, particularly if the NATO mission failed.
Macedonian Slavs feared a "demographic time bomb" and a possible partition of Kosovo,
which, in turn, would have created a precedent for a similar dissolution for Macedonia. I°7
The country's reluctance to take in refugees was shown during the first days of the Kosovo
crisis, when tens of thousands of Kosovars were prevented from crossing the border into

98. See id. at 99.
99. See

PATRICK BALL, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, POLICY OR PANIC? THE

1999, 31 (2000) [hereinafter AAAS REPORT].
100. See id. at 14.
101. See id. at 64.
102. See OSCE REPORT, supra note 82, at 99.
103. See EMG PLAN, supra note 86.
104. See id. There were approximately 400 collective centers in Albania during the Kosovo crisis, and even
today, the cost to repair these sites is expected to be between $400,000 and $800,000. The estimated cost of
repairing the land used for the refugee camps varies from $45,000 (for the Spitalle camp) to $250,000 (for the
Hamallaj camp). Repairs will also continue on Rinas Airport and the roads within Albania.
105. See OSCE REPORT, supra note 82, at 99. Discussion with the Macedonian Ambassador to the United
States places the figure at over 360,000. See Acevska Memo, supra note 53.
106. According to all sources, ethnic Albanians represent roughly one quarter of Macedonia's total population.
FLIGHT OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS FROMKosovo, MARCH-MAY

107.

SeeJACQUEs RUPNIK,

Kosovo: THE REGIONAL DIMENSION: NOTES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

ON Kosovo (2000) [hereinafter RUPNIK NOTES].
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Macedonia. After considerable negative publicity relating to this episode, Macedonia
opened its border to the waiting refugees.'
With substantial aid from the international community, the Macedonian government
ultimately erected seven major refugee camps. 109 There was an initial delay in the financial
support from relief agencies, which forced the Macedonian government to provide shelter
and support to the refugees."l l According to government officials, Macedonia spent over
$600 million, approximately 3.3 percent of GDP, on refugee-related expenditures. Much
of this cost, however, was recovered from the international community."'
In April 1999, at the height of the Kosovo crisis, Montenegro had over 74,000 refugees
from Kosovo."2 At the end of the NATO campaign, large numbers of refugees, particularly
Kosovo Serbs and Gypsies, remained within the borders of Montenegro.
In humanitarian terms, the international response to the refugee crisis was reasonably
effective. There were no serious public health consequences, despite the normal risk of
epidemic or increased mortality rates during such situations."' The mortality rate of the
refugees in Macedonia remained below one in 10,000, which is considered an acceptable
level during an emergency of this magnitude. Preliminary figures show that the situation
was similar in Albania."1
The success in dealing with the refugees can be attributed to the support from the governments of Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro; international humanitarian aid; and the
overall health of the refugees at the outset of the crisis." 5 For neighboring countries, the
strain of the crisis was somewhat alleviated by the quick end to hostilities and the unexpected
return of ninety-five percent of the refugees to Kosovo by late July 1999.116
The Kosovo refugee crisis has, however, had an enduring impact on the Balkan region.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 1,678,500
refugees or internally displaced persons in the Balkans as a result of a decade of upheaval
in the Former Yugoslavia."'
B. EcoNoMic

IMPACT

The economies of the countries of Southeastern Europe are exceptionally vulnerable to
external events. The primary reason for this sensitivity is that the region is plagued by deep
structural economic problems, underdeveloped rule of law, absence of the fundamentals of
a market economy, and a nascent understanding of and experience with democratic prin108. See UNHCR EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 89, 1 32.
109. Radusa, Senokos, Bojane, Neprosteno, Cegrare, Stenkovec I and Stenkovec II, and Blace.
110. See IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORT, FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: STAFF REPORT FORTHE
2000 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 11 (June 2000) [hereinafter MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT].

111. See id.
112. See David Dj. Dasic, Text prepared in anticipation of a Kosovo Conference (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter
Dasic Memo]; see also OSCE REPORT, supra note 82, at 99 (providing a figure of 70,000 refugees as of April
21, 1999).
113. See UNHCR EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 89, 32 n.6.
114. See id.
115. See id. tJ31-32.
116. See id. T 32; see also EMG PLAN, supra note 86.

117. See UNHCR, REFUGEES AND OTHERS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR:

STATISTICAL OVERVIEW-

FIRST QUAR-

2000 (May 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/ovOOql/text.htm. The total for BosniaHerzegovina was 871,200 persons, or roughly 22.7 percent of the total estimated population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
TER
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ciples. Domestic policies have generally failed to significantly alter these and other weaknesses. Thus, the Kosovo crisis emerged at a time when the region was already facing
arduous problems and political uncertainty, if not outright instability. That said, the region's
unremarkable economic performance during the past decade-the failure of each of these
countries to expand its private sectors, develop its infrastructure, or attract the level of
foreign investment needed to make up its domestic shortfall-suggest that the Kosovo crisis
may not have been the reversal of fortune that its governments have been claiming.
1. Trade
For most neighboring countries, the most serious economic effect of the Kosovo crisis
8
was the loss of the Yugoslav market for exports." When comparing first quarter data from
fact,
decline in Bulgaria (-20.2 percent),
did,
in
region
for
the
1998 and 1999, exports
19
Croatia (- 10.2 percent), and Romania (- 8.4 percent).' But, Albania's 1999 exports, valued at $72.9 million, actually increased by an impressive 72.7 percent over the first quarter
of 1998.120
In terms of volume, however, a detailed analysis of trade patterns indicates that the effect
of the Kosovo War on the region's exports was relatively insignificant. There are two main
reasons for this assessment.
First, regional exports quickly rebounded from the crisis. All four countries with available
1999 second quarter data experienced an increase in exports over their first quarter totals.
In Bulgaria, exports grew by 3.5 percent; in Romania by 3.9 percent; in Croatia by 5.7
percent; and in Albania by 7.5 percent.,''
Second, intraregional trade within Southeastern Europe is relatively insignificant for the
majority of the countries in the region. With the exception of Croatia and Macedonia, the
core Balkan countries have little economic exchange with other Balkan countries. Rather,
more than sixty percent of the region's trade is with the European Union, the Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) countries. 22 Trade statistics for 1998, prior to the crisis, reveal a relatively low level
of intraregional trade, suggesting that any effects caused by the Kosovo crisis could not
have been as dramatic as first proclaimed.
Of all the countries in Southeastern Europe, Croatia has the largest volume of exports
to the region. In 1998, regional trade accounted for 16.1 percent of Croatia's total exports;
23
the majority of this (14.8 percent) with Bosnia-Herzegovina.' In 1999, exports to BosniaHerzegovina plummeted, but this was due primarily to the cancellation of a bilateral free
Croatia's imtrade agreement with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1999.124
2
ports from the region were less significant at 2.8 percent of total imports. 1
118. This statement was based on discussions between the author and ambassadors from the various countries to the United States.
119. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 176, 248, and 640 (2000)

[hereinafter IFSI.
120. See id. at 76.
121. See id. at 76, 176, 248, and 640.
122. CEFTA is comprised of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. EFTA is comprised of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.

123. See

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK

1992-1998, 178

(1999) [hereinafter IMF DIRECTION OF TADE].
124. See CROATIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 97, at 68.
125. See IMF DIRECTION OFTRADE, supra note 123, at 178.

WINTER 2000

1206

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Percentage-wise, Macedonia's exports to Southeastern Europe-19.1 percent of its total
exports in 1998' 26-- are the most significant within the region. Before the Kosovo conflict,
Macedonia's largest regional export market was the FRY.' Imports from the region-20.4
percent of Macedonia's 1998 total imports-are also the most significant among the region's
countries. 21 Again, the majority of goods and services were imported from the FRY, ac29
counting for 11.4 percent of Macedonia's total imports that year.
Although Macedonia's trade was hit hard by the Kosovo crisis, the end of the hostilities
and the influx of aid workers brought unexpected gains in foreign exchange receipts.3 0
Exports to the FRY improved dramatically, nearly doubling the pre-crisis level.' Consequently, the overall decline in export receipts in 1999 was only eight percent, significantly
less than the projected export fall of twenty-seven percent. 3 2 Also, earnings from the service
sector increased significantly in the third and fourth quarters of 1999 because Macedonia
33
served as a key transit route for travel to Kosovo.
Bulgaria's overall trade to the region has always been relatively small.' 34 For instance, in
1998, Bulgaria's exports to Southeastern Europe equaled seven percent of its total exports. 3
Imports from the region into Bulgaria were only three percent. 36 Exports to the FRY were
only 2.3 percent and imports from the FRY were only 0.8 percent of Bulgaria's total trade
in 1998.'1 In fact, in the three months prior to NATO's air strike, export sales of industrial
products had already fallen by twenty-six percent compared to the same period in 1998. ' 1s
There is an additional reason to suspect that Bulgaria's deteriorating trade deficit was
not primarily the result of the Kosovo crisis. Although the trade deficit was 6.6 times higher
in the first half of 1999 than it was for the same period in 1998, this fact was anticipated
by both the Bulgarian government and the IME 139
Albania's exports to the region were also exceedingly low at only 2.3 percent of its total
1998 exports, 40 while imports from the region stood at 6.3 percent. As for trade with the
FRY, Albania's exports were 0.2 percent and imports were 0.1 percent of total trade in
1998.14' The major problems were the loss of reprocessing contracts during the crisis and
a disruption in chromium production.142

126. Seeid.
127. Seeid. at 306. In 1998 Macedonia exported $1.2 billion. Of this, $228 million was directed to Southeastern Europe.
128. Seeid.
129. Seeid.
130. SeeMACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 5.
131. Seeid.
132. See id.
133. Seeid.
134. See STANCHEV REPORT, supra note 95, at 3.
135. See id. Bulgaria's total exports for 1998 were $4.3 billion. See IMF DIRECTION OF TRADE, supra note
123, at 144.
136. See IMF DIRECTION OF TRADE, supra note 123, at 144.
137. See id. Bulgaria's total imports were $183 million. The vast majority of these imports came from
Macedonia and Romania.
138. See STACHEv REPORT, supra note 95, at I.
139. See id.
140. See IMF DIRECTION OF TRADE, supra note 123, at 96. Total exports were $255 million. Exports to the
region were $6 million.
141. See id.
142. See ALBANIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
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In 1998, Romania's exports to Southeastern Europe were three percent of its total exports. 43 Imports to the region were barely noticeable at one percent. Romania registered
no imports and 1.4 percent of exports to the FRY in 1998.44
Of Bosnia-Herzegovina's trade with Southeastern Europe, 95.8 percent is conducted with
exports,I4 while
Croatia.145 In 1998, exports to Croatia were 28.6 percent of Bosnia's14overall
7
imports from Croatia were 28.5 percent of Bosnia's total imports.
It is no surprise that the FRY was hit hardest by the Kosovo crisis. The Yugoslav economy
nearly collapsed. By May 1999, industrial output in the FRY declined by forty-five percent
compared to the same period in 1998. This was the lowest monthly output in thirty-five
years. 14 Yugoslav economists predict that, in the year 2000, industrial output will decrease
by 44.4 percent and GDP will decline by 40.7 percent compared to 1999.149
Montenegro's status within Southeastern Europe is unique. As a republic of the FRY,
0
Montenegro suffered actual damage as a result of NATO's military intervention.1 It also
lost substantial economic ties with companies in Serbia and Kosovo.
Since 1997, Montenegro's President, Milo Djukanovic, has accelerated democratic reforms and attempted to distance Montenegro from Belgrade policies. As a result, Montenegro has become a bastion of opposition to Belgrade, and to Milosevic in particular. The
Montenegrin pro-Western coalition defeated Milosevic supporters in two separate elections
in Montenegro in 1997 and 1998. The Kosovo crisis accelerated this movement and there
5
is now a "rampant independence" movement in Montenegro. ' At present, Montenegro's
economy is at a critical stage, with a declining GDP, growing unemployment, and a general
52
drop in the standard of living.
Montenegro has also been hard hit by a Serbian-imposed financial blockade. Following
the Kosovo crisis, Montenegro adopted a dual currency (the Deutschmark and the Yugoslav
Dinar), which brought swift retribution from Belgrade. Montenegro, a long-time importer
a severe crisis. Only with aid from the
of Serbian wheat," 3 suddenly found itself facing
54
United States did Montenegro avert a crisis.
Aggravating these problems, Montenegro has not been eligible for any macro-financial
assistance because it does not have the status of an independent state.' The IMF, according
143. See IMF

DIRECTION OF TRADE,

supra note 123, at 387.

144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 138.
147. See id.
148. See HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA, REPORT ON THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
SERBIA IN 1999, at http://www.helsinki.org.yu/god/egod99.htm.
149. See id.
150. Air strikes damaged the Podgorica airport, destroyed the Lim River Bridge and surrounding houses
and installations in the small town of Murina, and killed several civilians. In addition, military facilities located
in Montenegro were destroyed. The steel mill "Niksic," Montenegro's second largest company, suffered damages of approximately $10 million. See Memoranda from Dr. David Dj. Dasic, Head of Montenegro's Trade
Mission to the U.S. to Mark Ellis (Nov. 19, 1999) (on file with author).
151. See RUPNIK NOTES, supra note 107.
152. See id.
153. See SERBIA'S GRAIN TRADE: MILOSEviC's HIDDEN CASH CROP 21 (May 2000) [hereinafter ICG GRAIN
REPORT].

154. See id. Under the U.S. Presidential Wheat Initiative, the U.S. Department of Agriculture provided
50,000 tons of maize and wheat to Montenegro in March 2000.
155. See Media Club, We Cannot Help as Long as You Are Not an Independent State (Feb. 29, 2000), at http:/
/www.medijaklub.cg.yu/eng/news/archive/2000Februar/29.htm.
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to its charter, can assist only countries, not provinces.15 6 Until recently, the Ministers of the
EU refused to provide Montenegro with any financial aid, other than humanitarian assistance. This appears to be changing. Commenting on a $100 million pledge in direct financial aid, Chris Patten, EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner, said that while the money was
not intended to directly enhance the government, it was "support for [a] government that
believes in elections.""' Montenegro will also receive support from the United States in
the amount of $55 million.'
2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Real growth in the region's gross domestic product (GDP), already dismally low, declined
0.9 percent in 1998.119 Today, the GDP for the region is the lowest in all of Europe. 16 0 For
example, the combined GDP of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Mace6
donia, and Romania is equivalent to that of the city of Hamburg.' '
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) reports that GDP
for the region fell from 0.3 percent before the Kosovo crisis to - 1.1 percent in August
1999.162 The total GDP for the region fell from $82.6 billion in 1998 to an estimated $73.9
billion in 1999.163 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the Kosovo crisis
reduced output for the countries of Southeastern Europe by approximately two percent.
64
Growth for 1999 is estimated to have been - 1 percent for the region.'
However, some individual countries fared better than the average. Albania's GDP increased by 7.25 percent in 1999 over the previous year. 6 This was a direct result of increased demand, particularly in the areas of transportation and services, which grew by ten
percent over 1998 as a result of the crisis. 66 And even though the Kosovo-related reconstruction costs accounted for four percent of the GDP in 1999, international donors fi67

nanced most of these costs.'

In Macedonia, the Kosovo crisis disrupted what was already a difficult transition to a
market-based economy. Nevertheless, the damage was less severe than initially predicted.6 s
The government was able to maintain the fiscal discipline obtained over the previous several
years.169 In fact, the post-crisis period in Kosovo resulted in a sharp increase in economic
activity for Macedonia. 70 Real GDP grew, inflation eased, and foreign exchange reserves
increased substantially.' 7' ByJune 1999, the economy improved significantly and the balance
note 17, at question 490.
156. See Cook Statement, supra
157. Montenegro to Get 55 Million Euros, May 15, 2000, at http://www.montenegro.com/en/arc4-2000.htm.
158. See Anne Swardson, Montenegro Seen as a Beacon of Hope, Reform-Minded Ally a Modelfor Balkans,WASH.
POST,

May 24, 2000, at A25.

159. See IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83, at table 1.
160. See id. 93.
161. See RuPNiK NOTES, supra note 107.
162. See EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 83.

163. See IMF

REPORT SEPT.

note 83, at table 1.
1999, supra

164. See id. 93.
note 8, at 6.
165. See ALBANIA STAFF REPORT, supra
166. See id.
167. See id. at 10.

168. See MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 5.
169. See J. de Beaufort Wijuholds, Statement by the Executive Director for Former Yugoslav Republic of
note 110.
Macedonia (May 10, 2000), inMACEDONIA STAF REPORT, supra
170. See MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 26.
171. See id.
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of payments improved beyond expectations.' 72 This improvement led to an increase in GDP
by 2.7 percent for 1999.111 The service sector suffered little during the Kosovo crisis and
74
industrial output losses were quickly recaptured after the end of the crisis.
The IMF projects the average growth rate for the region to be approximately three
percent for 2000.175 Although that rate will be too low to compensate for the slow performance prior to the Kosovo crisis, it does indicate an overall positive recovery. However, to
meet even this modest projection, the region will need $850 million in external financing
over and beyond current commitments from bilateral creditors and multinational financial
176
institutions.
3. Balance of Payments
During 1999, the countries of Southeastern Europe were also faced with additional financing requirements as a result of the Kosovo crisis. The total gap in balance of payments
for countries in the region, including costs directly relating to the Kosovo crisis, totaled
approximately $2.4 billion.'77 As with performance in GDP, the gap in balance of payments
varies among the six countries.'
The largest balance of payment gap for 1999 falls on Romania ($861 million) and Bulgaria
($511 million). Croatia ($350 million) and Bosnia-Herzegovina ($268 million) fall somewhere in the middle range, while Macedonia ($193 million) and Albania ($169 million) have
the smallest balance of payment gap. To begin closing these financing gaps, the EU and
the World Bank sponsored country-specific donor meetings during April and May 1999
for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. To cover the gap in 2000, how79
ever, the region will need an estimated $869 million in additional financing.
crisis, Albania
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experienced a tremendous
spread pyramid scheme in early 1997.1 s0 During this period, "GDP declined by more than
7 percent and inflation rose sharply to 42 percent."'' To rectify the situation, the Albanian
government focused its attention on important issues related to structural reform and macroeconomic performance. Though highly successful, these reforms were interrupted in
82
September 1998 when civil disturbances resulted in a change in government.' The new
government continued the reforms and maintained a tight monetary policy. While inflation
was reduced to 8.7 percent, the account deficit dropped from twelve percent of GDP in
1997 to six percent of GDP in 1998.1s3
172. See id.
173. See
id.
id.
174. See
note 83, $ 20.
175. IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra
176. See id. $ 21.
at table 2.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. This scheme, like many others in Central and Eastern Europe, promised high returns to those that
invested their money. With average wages so low, roughly one-sixth of all Albanians had invested in this scheme.
The resulting collapse, coupled with the government's unwillingness to bail out the scheme, created protests
and looting in the streets of Tirana.
181. EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION OF THE WORLD BANK, ALBANIA: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
Kosovo CRISIS $ 2 (1999) [hereinafter WB ALBANIA].

182. See id. 1$3-4.
183. See id. at table 1.
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In early 1999, macroeconomic stability had been restored to Albania, but the Kosovo
crisis brought new challenges. Although the international community eventually assumed
the financial burden of the refugees, the initial influx forced the Albanian government to
4
divert financial resources to assist them, creating an even more significant budgetary gap.1
Between 1998 and 1999, the budget gap increased from 10.4 percent to 13.8 percent of
GDP."s5 As a result, nearly the entire budgetary gap for 1999 ($200 million) can be attributed to the Kosovo crisis with funds allocated directly to refugee assistance equal to expenditures for health, education, public order, public works, and local infrastructure.1

6

To cover its budgetary gap in 1999, Albania turned to foreign financing, thus raising that
portion of its debt from a projected 4.2 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP."S7 Albania received
financing from the World Bank's Public Expenditure Support Credit ($30 million), the first
tranche of the Structural Adjustment Credit ($20 million), deferral of the Paris Club debtservice payments ($13 million), and an EU budgetary grant ($65 million).'88
As already discussed, the economic cost of the refugee crisis hit Macedonia especially
hard, totaling more than $660 million. s9 To finance its support of the refugees, the Macedonian government was forced to redirect funds from an already restricted budget. Consequently, structural reforms were slowed. For instance, Macedonian authorities were unable to comply with their commitments to a new IMF-funded Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF).' 9° However, Macedonia's pledge "to a number of important
policy initiatives, including strengthening expenditure management, enhancing banking
supervision, reforming enterprises, and phasing out trade restrictions" led them to receive
a $19 million credit under the IMF's Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility
(CCFF) to offset the effects of the Kosovo crisis.' 91
4. CurrentAccount Deficit
Both the IMF and the EBRD report that the current account deficit (CAD) 92 decreased
for the region as a result of the events in Kosovo.193 With the exception of Romania, where
the CAD increased from $321 million to $491 million, the CAD for countries in Southeastern Europe decreased between the first and second quarters of 1999.194
In Albania, the influx of nearly half a million refugees, followed by deployment of a
substantial NATO military force, the massive influx of Western aid and aid workers, and a

184. See id. 9115 and table 4.
185. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WORLD BANK AND IMF, THE IMPACT OFTHE Kosovo CONFLICTON ALBANIA
5(b) (May 26, 1999) [hereinafter EUROPEANCOMMISSION ON ALBANIA].
186. WB ALBANIA, supra note 181, $ 9.
187. See id. at table 4.
188. Seeid. 1 22.
189. See Aleksandar Dimitrov, Address at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting to the East Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (Dec. 16, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/
s991216h.htm).
190. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves CCFF Credit for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(Aug. 5, 1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/999/pr9937.htm.
191. Id.
192. Current account is the value for the net flow of goods, services, and unilateral transactions (gifts)
between countries.
193. See IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83. Current account balances for the region fell from $6.3
billion in 1998 to an estimated $5.9 billion in 1999.
194. SeeIFS, supra note 119.
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consequent rise in hard currency purchases, contributed to an actual $30 million current
account surplus in the second quarter of 1999.'19
Starting in March 1999, Bulgaria's stronger-than-expected exporting growth pushed the
current account deficit to a surplus by October 1999.196 Although Bulgaria's exports diminished during the initial stages of the Kosovo crisis, by the end of April 1999 they had
recovered. 197
In Croatia, the tourist industry was hardest hit by the Kosovo crisis. During the first
eight months of 1999, Croatia experienced a sixteen percent drop in tourism compared to
199
1998.198 Losses from tourist expenditures were estimated at $700-800 million. An additional $6.6 million in tourist tax revenues were lost and $9 million was spent to subsidize
21
tour operators. 00° Despite these setbacks, the damage was not as great as initially thought.
In fact, the Croatian CAD was reduced by over $40 million between the first and second
quarters of 1999.202 Additionally, the tourist industry is expected to bounce back in the year
2000.
5. Unemployment
Overall, the unemployment rate for Southeastern Europe was not affected by the Kosovo
crisis. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania, unemployment levels remained relatively unchanged or declined. In Albania and Macedonia, fluctuations in the
already high unemployment rates are explained by other factors.
Based on a report by the Central Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo conflict did
not appear to have any significant impact on overall employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Between February 18, 1999, and May 31, 1999, the unemployment rate increased only
20 3
slightly, from 39.07 percent to 39.17 percent.
Likewise, in Croatia, the unemployment rate remained steady between 18.0 percent and
19.6 percent during 1999.204 The rate ended up slightly lower by December than it had
been in January. As a result, Croatia's expenditures on unemployment benefits, as a percentage of GDP, actually decreased from 0.3 percent in 1998 to 0.2 percent in 1999.205
In Bulgaria, monthly unemployment rates remained steady through August 1999 before
beginning a steep rise at the end of the year.206 During 1999, Romania's unemployment
rate fluctuated mildly between 10.8 percent and 12.0 percent.2 0°
195. See generally id. at 76;
inafter

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ALBANIA: STATE OF THE NATION,

3 (2000) [here-

ICG ALBANIA].

196. See IMF, STAFF COUNTRY REPORT,
[hereinafter BULGARIASTAFF REPORT].
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197. See id. at 32.

198. See CROATIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 97, at 103.
199. See REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, MINISTRY OF TOURISM,

ESTIMATION OF DAMAGESTO CROATIAN TOURISM

CAUSED BY THE Kosovo CRISIS (1999).

200. See id.
201. See IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83, 1 6.
202. See IFS, supra note 119, at 248.
203. See CENTRAL BANK OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, INDICES OF BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS, availableat
http://www.cbbh.gov.ba/english/statistics.htm.
204. See First Release, Data Reports, available at http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/First%20Release99/
FirstRelease.htm.
205. See CROATIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 97, at 24.
206. See REAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS, availableat http://www.ipis.online.bg/maeroeco/realsec.html (2000).
207. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR STATISTICS, REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT- 1999, available at http://
www.cns.ro/Indicatori/San_2000/eng/unemployment_1999_eng.htm.
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In Macedonia, unemployment during the Kosovo crisis remained extremely high at 32.5
percent.20 8 Unemployment benefits remained high, resulting in a $22 million grant from
the United States to assist in paying unemployment benefits. 209 Macedonia's unemployment
rate actually fell by two percentage points during 1999, as compared to the previous year.210
The Kosovo crisis actually provided a significant number of jobs to Macedonia in the area
of aid work.
Albania's unemployment rate did increase during the Kosovo crisis, but the cause of the
escalation is not entirely clear. In a meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder,
Albania Democratic Party Chairman and former President Dr. Sali Berisha stated that the
unemployment rate "increased from I1 percent to 47 percent and in certain areas to 67
percent."2 ' According to Berisha, this increase was a result of the Kosovo crisis compounded by organized crime and corruption. 212 However, a report by the Albanian Ministry
of Labor concluded that the two main causes of the rise in unemployment during the period
of the war were the continued privatization of state-owned enterprises and the migration
of people from rural to urban areas." 3 In addition, the influx of refugees from Kosovo
actually lowered unemployment in the northern district of Kukes because the opening of
the border with Kosovo boosted the activities of local companies, creating a demand for
more labor2l4
6. Foreign DirectInvestment

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another important indicator of the region's economic
health after the Kosovo crisis. Again, results vary across the region, but evidence does not
indicate a permanent "widespread collapse" of FDI in Southeastern Europe as a result of
the conflict.-0
FDI in Bulgaria and Croatia actually increased between 1998 and 1999. Although FDI
into Bulgaria between January and June 1999 was $220 million, $10 million less than during
the same period in 1998,216 the last two quarters of 1999 saw a sharp rise in FDI. Curiously,
Bulgaria closed the largest privatization deals in its history during the war. Russia's Lukoil
acquired the Neftochim oil refinery at the Port of Borgas, while Israel's Zeevi Group acquired the national air carrier, Balkan, and Hellenic Telecom partnered with other West
European interests to emerge as the high bidder for Bulgarian Telecom. Foreign investors
seemed prepared to make long-term commitments in Sofia.
However, FDI in Albania, Macedonia, and Romania declined. Romania was hit exceptionally hard, losing roughly fifty percent of its foreign investment between 1998 and 1999.
Albania, which had the least amount of foreign investment among the countries in the
region, also saw a decline in FDI. According to Dr. Berisha, the combination of corruption

208. See MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 5.
209. See U.S. Aid for Macedonia, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Dec. 14,1999, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/
12/141299.htnl.
210. See MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 5.
211. Press Release, Democratic Party of Albania, Schroeder-Berisha Meeting (Sept. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.albania.co.uk/dp/220999.html [hereinafter Press Release].
212. Id.
213. See ICG ALBANIA,supra note 195, at n.5.
214. See id.
215. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 84.
216. See STANCHEV REPORT, supra note 95, at 1.
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and organized crime in Albania, compounded with the crisis in Kosovo, caused over ninety
percent of foreign investors to leave Albania.217 During 1999 and early 2000, no major
foreign investment deal was completed in Albania.2 ' The significant decline in FDI in
Macedonia is directly attributable to the Kosovo Crisis. The perceived instability resulting
from the military campaign and the refugee crisis, as well as the fear that the conflict would
exacerbate the ethnic balance within Macedonia, caused the decline in FDI.
V. Post-Conflict Initiatives
A.

STRUCTURAL REFORM

The EBRD notes that "[tihere is no clear evidence that the crisis in Kosovo has affected
the willingness or the pace of structural reform efforts in the [Southeastern European]
region. All countries in the region have continued, and on some occasions even accelerated,
difficult reforms during the course of 1999."219
The countries in the region continue to meet the targets set by the IMF for compliance
with loan programs. Albania, for example, has continued to implement structural reforms
"despite the adverse effects of the Kosovo crisis." 220 Albania liquidated, privatized, or transferred to local authorities 520 small or medium-sized enterprises in 1999.221 Furthermore,
the administrative bureaucracy was reduced by 5,000 employees during 1999.22 Bank privatization, which was halted during the Kosovo crisis and is one of the most important
structural reforms, is back on track.223
Bulgaria continues to implement structural reforms started in 1997. In fact, during the
Kosovo crisis, the IMF reported that Bulgaria actually accelerated structural reforms.224 In
July 1999, laws giving the state the right to intervene in price setting were abolished, and
privatization proceeded apace. 2 5 The country also acceded to CEFTA in 1999 and signed
free trade agreements with Turkey and Macedonia.
Although Romania experienced a financial crisis in 1998, reforms nevertheless progressed
during the Kosovo crisis.226 For example, in March 1999, the Romanian Development Bank
became the first Romanian bank to be privatized.227 In June 1999, a new privatization law
was passed, giving small shareholders more control and access to information.22 Following
a recent review, the IMF Executive Board called on the World Bank to work with Romania

217. Press Release, supra note 211.
218. See ALBANIASTAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.

219. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 84. The EBRD lists eight transitional indicators to be taken into
account when grading structural reform in Eastern Europe: large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization,
trade and foreign exchange systems, price liberalization, enterprise restructuring, competition policy, banking
reform and interest rate liberalization, and securities markets and nonbank financial institutions.
220. ALBANIASTAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 43.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 14.
223. Id. at 49. Both the National Commercial Bank and the Savings Bank appear to be on the way towards
privatization by the end of 2000.
224. IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83, 1 8.
225. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 202.
226. IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83, 8.
227. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 254.
228. Id. at 255.
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to "undertake a comprehensive program to address structural weaknesses in the regulation
and supervision of non-bank financial institutions. 2 29 The IMF regards these structural
reforms as "critical."

230

Macedonia, the country hit hardest by events in Kosovo, had a virtual economic breakdown during the first half of 1999. Structural reforms, already progressing slowly, were
halted.231 As a result, Macedonia defaulted on commitments to an IMF Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which included addressing fundamental weaknesses in the
banking and enterprise sectors. 232 Since the end of the crisis, Macedonia has resumed privatization and stabilization programs. 33 There are, however, significant hurdles that Macedonia must overcome, including "downsizing the bloated civil service" and accelerating
enterprise sector reforms so that corporate governance and enterprise performance will
234
improve.
Croatia is in "the final stretch towards World Trade Organization (WTO) accession."23
Several laws have been amended or passed to ensure compliance with WTO principles.
Relative to earlier events surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo crisis did not
have a strong effect on Croatia. The number of Kosovar refugees and asylum seekers into
Croatia was also small compared to other Balkan states and did not, therefore, strain governmental control over the reform process. Finally, the change in government at the end
of 1999 has led to an invigorated reform schedule as Croatia aspires to accede to European
institutions.
In Bosnia, current economic indicators are promising, with low inflation and growth in
GDP estimated at ten percent in 1999.236 Structural reform will continue to be a struggle.
For example, the privatization of banks and enterprises and the harmonization of excise
taxes across7 the Entities have been extremely slow and continue to be hampered by ethnic
divisions."'

B.

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

When dealing with issues of reconstruction and stabilization in Southeastern Europe, it
is best to remember that the problems and challenges are not merely the consequence of a
decade of turmoil and war. They also reflect the influence that fifty years of communism
238
had on the economies of these countries.
One of the major issues confronting the region after the Kosovo crisis is the overall
stabilization. The response by the international community to conditions arising in Southeastern Europe has long been "piece-meal... wondering where the next crisis would erupt,

229. IMF Completes Romania Review, Approves Ertensianand $116 Million Credit, IMF NEWS BRIEF, June 7,
2000, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2000/NBOO42.htm.

230. Id.
231. MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 3.
232. IMF REPORT SEPT. 1999, supra note 83, 8.
233. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 218.
234. MACEDONIA STAFF REPORT, supra note 110, at 28.
235. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 206.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Chris Patten, Remarks at the Conference on Economic Reconstruction in the Balkans (Sept. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Patten Remarks).
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' 23 9
For there to be any long-lasting
attempting to apply the sticking plaster when it did.
peace and stability in the region, there must be a plan to revive and build the region's
economy as a whole.
In addition, the countries of the region must continue implementing market-oriented
reforms. This includes encouraging the international community to participate in foreign
direct investment, improve conditions for trade, and assist in reducing the development
gap.
Finally, enduring reforms cannot rest on individual countries or even on cooperation
among nations in the region. The Balkans must be integrated with Europe, specifically with
24
the European Union. 1
Former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov spoke eloquently about this issue:

Relations among Balkan countries must be based on new European relations ... There is
limited opportunity for economic cooperation. The Balkan countries are small countries with
small markets. To leave the region outside of Europe, to embrace the recommendation for a
miniature partnership for peace is not the answer. Macedonia does not shy away from regional
cooperation. However, association and integration should not be of the region as a whole, but
of each country depending on the development of its democracy. Otherwise, the least advanced
in terms of economy, legal systems, democracy, and minority rights-will hold back the inte2 41
gration of other countries.

C. Stability Pact
The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, in which twenty-eight countries and several
international organizations participate, is the primary initiative controlling post-war economic reconstruction in Southeastern Europe.2 4 The Pact's chief objective is to foster
greater economic integration and political cooperation among the countries of Southeastern
Europe, and to assist the region as a whole in achieving closer integration with Europe. To
accomplish this, the nations of Southeastern Europe have pledged their cooperation in
meeting a preliminary set of objectives.2 3 The European Union appointed a special coor-

239. Id.
240. See THE ROAD TO STABILITY, supra note 6.
241. Kiro Gligorov, Address on the International Commission on the Balkans Report, Unfinished Peace, at
the Regional Meeting of the Aspen Institute of Berlin (Mar. 1998).
242. European Commission, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe
(OSCE), United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), NATO, the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD), the West European Union (WEU), the IMF,
the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Central European Initiative (CEI), the
Southeastern Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP),
and the Southeastern European Defense Ministers (SEDM) group.
243. These objectives include: implementing measures intended to dispel tensions and existing potential for
conflict; establishing a democratic political process and a free and open society; creating a good relationship
with the other countries in the region through observance of the Helsinki Final Act; preserving diversity in
the nations and protecting minorities; creating market economies; economic cooperation between the countries
in the region and between the region and the rest of the world, including free trade areas; promotingunimpeded
contacts among citizens; combating organized crime, corruption, and terrorism; working to prevent population
displacement as a result of war, persecution, or poverty; ensuring the safe return of refugees; and creating
conditions conducive for countries in Southeastern Europe to fully integrate into political, economic, and
security structures of their choice. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, June 10, 1999, § 111, 1 10 [hereinafter Stability Pact].

WINTER 2000

1216

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

dinator, and has outlined a Stability and Association Process, focusing on bilateral agreements that aim at eventual EU membership for each participating country. While the European Union will make a final determination on questions of integration, it will take into
consideration the achievements and progress that each nation makes under the Stability
Pact. 44
The countries of Southeastern Europe view the Stability Pact as a channel through which
the international community can help to bring stability and prosperity to the region. As
stated by the Macedonian Ambassador to the United States, "the Stability Pact offers a
significant opportunity for peace, stability and prosperity to prevail in the region of South
East Europe and its integration into the European family."24 5 At the same time, countries
of the region tend to see the Pact as a "complex web of mutual commitments" that has yet
to bring concrete results and is "not immune from bureaucratic wrangling and institutional
rivalries."2 As one diplomat stated, "The membership of the Stability Pact should stop
'2 47
coordinating and start cooperating."
The countries of Southeastern Europe have warned about the problems of delaying the
Pact's implementation:
We expect the international institutions to promptly effectuate their support to the realization
of the projects included in the Pact. It is the only way to commence in a timely manner the
process of comprehensive development of the region. Any inefficiency or delay in the projects'
realization may impede our common goals contained in the Stability Pact and may be even
interpreted as [a] wrong signal for the countries in the region. Therefore we advocate prompt
realization of the approved projects in accordance with the conclusions of the first Regional
24
Funding Conference in Brussels.
Countries in the region are also becoming frustrated with the lack of progress from the
Stability Pact. 49 In a recent roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C., the ambassadors
from Southeastern Europe commented that although there have been many meetings regarding the Pact, there has been very little international support or funding for several
proposed projects.250 Progress, the ambassadors stressed, is needed to maintain popular
support, and failure to show results could lead to election losses for the region's current
democratic governments."' All ambassadors at the Washington Roundtable agreed that at

244. Id. 20.
245. Letter from Ljubica Z. Acevska, Macedonian Ambassador to the United States, to Mark Ellis (June 13,
2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Acevska Letter].
246. Letter from G6za Jeszenszky, Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, to Mark Ellis (Jan. 27,
2000) (on file with author).
247. Bulgaria Opposed to Kosovar Independence, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, June 20, 2000, at http://www.rferl.org/
newsline/2000/06/200600.html.
248. Acevska Letter, supra note 245.
249. Bulgaria Opposed to Kosovar Independence, supra note 247.
250. Roundtable Discussion hosted by the Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) at the Washington office of the American Bar Association, The Consequence of the Kosovo Crisis on SoutheasternEurope (June
8, 2000) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Washington Roundtable]. The roundtable was attended
by Albanian Ambassador to the United States, Pettit Bushati; Bosnian Ambassador tothe United States, Sven
Alkalaj; Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States, Philip Dimitrov; Macedonian Ambassador to the United
States, Ljubica Z. Acevska; Romanian Ambassador to the United States, Mircea Geoana; Deputy Chief of the
Croatian Mission to the United States, Branko Baricevic; and the Head of the Montenegrin Trade Mission to
the United States, Dr. David Dj. Dasic.
251. Id.
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least one concrete project per country needs to be completed as soon as possible to avoid
losing the faith of the people. In addition to economic aid, the ambassadors favored an
aggressive program to create a judicial and policing system, thus establishing a legal framework for the future.52
Criticism of the Pact has also come from prominent "outside" players who view it as "an
empty thing without any content."2" ' The danger, they charge, is in having "unrestricted
markets... combined with governments too weak to maintain law and order.1154 Others
question whether the Pact will really move things along or remain a "rather clumsy structure, with its nearly 40 members." 2"1The argument is that, because of the Pact's large
number of constituents, real work is difficult to achieve and, realistically, agreements between organizations like NATO, OSCE, the European Union, and the World Bank can
never be carried out. 256 Such skepticism is further fed by the unrealistic expectations held
by many in Southeastern Europe. They expect the Stability Pact to improve their living
257
standards, and this, in turn, has raised hopes within the region beyond what is possible.
There is further concern that the Stability Pact Coordinator has neither power nor control over the "purse strings" and civil service that are essential for effecting change in the
region,25 8 or in other countries in the region. Instead, he/she can only try to persuade the
29
various international government and NGOs to assist the region.
Another focal point for criticism is that the Pact so far has not accelerated the process
of gaining membership in the European Union.260 Instead, the EU continues to rely on
bilateral treaties (Europe Agreements) designed to speed up the reform process within
prospective member states. The Stabilization and Association Agreement, which does not
promise future EU membership, is an alternative form of contractual relations used by the
European Union for the "Western Balkans."

261

Yet, the countries of Southeastern Europe count European integration as the region's
number one priority. As one representative stated: "The most serious guarantee for the
security of Southeastern Europe and its transformation into the region of democracy, prosperity and stability and cooperation is full integration of the countries from the region into
2 '62
NATO and the European Union.
However, as a precursor to EU membership, the countries of Southeastern Europe must
benefit from integration into existing European organizations.2 63 One of these organizations

252. Id.
253. Don Hill, International Financier Criticizes Balkan Stability Pact, RFE/RL, Oct. 11, 1999, at http://
www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/10/f.ru.991011141720.html.
254. Id.
255. Cyrill Steiger, Europe'sPlanfor Pacifying the Balkans. The Stability Pact: VerbalActivism or a New Start?,
NZZ ONLINE (Nov. 11, 1999), at http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/backgroundl999/background991 1/
bg991 110balkans.html.
256. See id.
257. Seeid.
258. What They Said: Special Coordinator of the Southeastern Europe Stability Pact Bodo Hombach, EUROPE,
Feb. 2000, at A.

259.
260.
261.
262.
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Vladimir Gligorov, Scoring the Stability Pact (May 3, 2000), at http://www.omri.cz/may00/scoringt.html.
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Acevska Letter, supra note 245.
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is CEFTA. CEFTA should reach out to include the Southeastern Europe countries as
members. Membership criteria should include economic and political benchmarks designed
to lead to EU membership.'- The Southeastern European countries should also take full
part in other regional organizations such as the WTO, Southeastern Europe Cooperation
Initiative (SECI), Central European Initiative (CEI),South Eastern Europe Cooperation
Process (SEECP), Southeastern European Defense Ministers (SEDM), the European Commission, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council
26
of Europe.
Perhaps the most popular argument against the Stability Pact is that the FRY remains
outside the Stability Pact group. There is a general sense that "without a democratic Federal
2 66
Republic of Yugoslavia there can be no lasting stability in the region."
For economic reconstruction to be successful, the involvement of the FRY is vital. The
Kosovo war, including the NATO bombing, destroyed much of Serbia's industrial base.
Despite the current embargo against the FRY, its eventual recovery is crucial for the economic health and political stability of Southeastern Europe. The FRY is important to the
region because of its market size and its strategic geographical position as a main transport
route between Western Europe and the Balkans67 As one commentator stated, "it is hard
to imagine the Pact succeeding without Serbia. Kosovo's infrastructure and economy is [sic]
inextricably linked with Belgrade through ownership of many companies serving the Ko26
sovo economy.
The neighboring countries of Southeastern Europe are unanimous in their position that
trade normalization with the FRY should be achieved as soon as possible. Following normalization, intraregional trade can be restored quickly. In addition, foreign direct investment is likely to increase because investors tend to see Southeastern Europe as a large
regional market, rather than as single country markets. 2 69 Open border crossings and sim-

plified regional transportation are only a few of the benefits that will be gained by foreign
investors when the FRY is again economically liberalized. Eventual restructuring of the
FRY will also have a multiplier effect in the region, given participation by other Southeast
European countries in rebuilding the FRY.
The lack of transportation routes to and from the former Yugoslavia still contributes to
the poor trade performance of neighboring countries. The Danube River, Serbian roads,
and railways remain essential transport routes from Southeastern Europe to Western Europe and other ports within the region.270 The EBRD estimates that the closure of transport
routes through Serbia raised transport costs by up to fifty percent for exports from Bulgaria
and Macedonia to the European Union."'
The closing of the Danube, however, is not the main reason for difficulties in transporting
goods from the region to Central Europe. In February 2000, Belgrade tightened its trade
embargo against Macedonia by restricting both imports and the export of grain and other
264. Id.
265. Patten Remarks, supra note 238.
266. Bodo Hombach, Address at the Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the South
East Europe Co-operation Process (Feb. 12, 2000).
267. Id.
268. Dickon Reid, Turning Words into Deeds, CENTRAL EUROPEAN, Sept. 1999.
269. Discussions with ambassadors from the region.
270. EBRD REPORT, supra note 88, at 84.
271. Id.
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food to Macedonia.2 It also required a license for Macedonian trucks and trains to travel
through Serbian territory.273 Because roughly seventy percent of Macedonia's total exports
go through the FRY27 4 this action closed Macedonia's most efficient route to Europe and
forced the country to rely on more expensive and longer routes through Kosovo and Bulgaria.275 Prior to the Kosovo War, Macedonia had sent roughly 25,000 truckloads of cargo
a year north into Serbia.276
It is significant that the countries of Southeastern Europe not only believe that a key to
peace, prosperity, and security in the region is a democratic FRY, but are willing to include
representatives from the FRY in the reform efforts.277 Already, representatives from Mon27
tenegro and from Serbian opposition groups participate in the Stability Pact as guests.
One Stability Pact initiative to promote ties with opposition-ruled municipalities in Serbia
has gained wide support among Pact members. The "Szeged Process" will establish relations between Western cities and Serbian cities so as to promote ties to the Serbian opposition.279 The thought is that it is necessary to support democratic forces in the FRY and
promote their efforts towards democratic change, including the removal of FRY president
Slobodan Milosevic from office.2s Although it is unrealistic to expect these changes to occur
overnight, the countries in the region support a concentrated effort towards achieving this
281
aim.
The Stability Pact has achieved some success in reversing the flight of FDI out of the
region. Their first initiative was an "Investment Compact" designed "to assist countries in
the region in promoting private sector development and [in] attracting foreign investment."2 82 It is hoped that other initiatives, to reduce crime and corruption, for example, or
to promote democratization and human rights and strengthen regional security, will help
'
raise investor confidence in the region and promote economic growth. 83
As the Stability Pact gains momentum, its successes may quiet the critics. However, this
will depend particularly on maintaining realistic expectations about the Pact. It is important
for all parties to remember what the Stability Pact is not. As Mate Granic, Croatian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, stated: "The Pact is not an international organization and thus it does
not have membership. The Pact is not an international agreement and, therefore, it is not
28 4
signed. The Pact is an expression of political will of the countries participating in it."
Critics may still try to fault the scheme, but as long as each nation can voluntarily commit

272. ICG GRAIN REPORT, supra note 153, at 22.
273. Id. at 156.
274. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE Kosovo CRISs: AN UPDATED
ASSESSMENT (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pt/kosovo/052594.htm.
275. ICG GRAIN REPORT, supra note 153, at 23.
276. Author's discussion with Glenn Levine, Consultant to ABA/CEELI, on trade issues in Southeastern
Europe.
277. Washington Roundtable, supra note 250.
278. Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State, Achievements of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (April
6, 2000).
279. Id.
280. Washington Roundtable, supra note 250.
281. Acevska Letter, supra note 245.
282. Fact Sheet from the Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Achievements of the Stability Pact
for Southeast Europe (Nov. 18, 1999), at http://ofcn.org/cyber.serv/teledem/pb/1999/nov/msg0213.html.
283. Id.
284. Mate Granic, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister, Speech before the Croatian Parliament (Oct. 19,1999).
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to regional stabilization efforts, then the Stability Pact will serve a useful function in Southeastern Europe.
VI. Conclusion
While events in Kosovo were largely overshadowed by a decade of conflict that devastated
the former Yugoslavia, the crisis of 1999 was by no means unforeseen. Belgrade's nullification of Kosovo's once protected autonomy capped seven years of increasingly harsh and
repressive policies in that province. As early as 1991, international organizations were warning of the grave consequences of Serbian oppression in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, in particular the repression of the
ethnic Albanian population, continued unabated.
Even after the Dayton Accords effectively ended Belgrade's war against Bosnia, the international community essentially chose to ignore the Kosovo problem. This single-minded
preoccupation with Bosnia not only prevented an early resolution to the emerging crisis in
Kosovo, but set in motion an inevitable chain of events that ultimately led to the outbreak
of war.
The effect of the Kosovo war on neighboring countries was both immediate and severe.
At the height of the crisis, roughly 700,000 refugees from Kosovo were sheltered throughout Southeastern Europe, most of them in Albania and Macedonia. Fortunately, due to
tremendous efforts on the part of neighboring countries and substantial aid from the international community, the international response to the refugee crisis was relatively effective. By July 1999, ninety-five percent of the refugees housed in neighboring countries had
returned to Kosovo.
While the burden of supporting vast refugee populations placed a tremendous strain on
the countries of Southeastern Europe, the overall effect on the region's economic stability
was not severe. Relatively poor economic performance throughout the region during the
1990s suggests that the Kosovo crisis may not have caused the reversal of fortune that many
Southeast European governments claimed.
For most neighboring countries, the most serious economic repercussion was the loss of
the Yugoslav market for exports. However, a detailed analysis of trade patterns indicates
that the war's effect on the region's exports was relatively insignificant. There are two main
reasons for this assessment. First, regional exports quickly rebounded from the crisis. Second, interregional trade is negligible for most countries in Southeastern Europe. Croatia
and Macedonia are the two exceptions to this finding, as both conduct substantial trade
within the region.
Other economic indicators such as the GDP, balance of payments, CAD, unemployment,
and FDI suggest that the Kosovo crisis did not create permanent, or even long-lasting,
damage to the region's economic base. There is also no clear evidence that the crisis in
Kosovo affected the willingness or the pace of structural reform efforts in the region.
Of course, structural reform will continue to be a struggle for the region, and the process
of reconstruction and stabilization in Southeastern Europe must remain a priority for the
international community. One unexpected consequence of the Kosovo crisis is the recognition that long-lasting peace and stability hinge on the growth and continued strength of
the region's economy.
The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, in which twenty-eight countries and several
international organizations participate, is currently the primary vehicle through which to
achieve sustainable economic reconstruction in the region. While the countries of SouthVOL. 34, NO. 4
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eastern Europe see the Stability Pact as a potential impetus to regional stability and prosperity, they have also expressed frustration with the lack of progress from the Stability Pact.
If, in fact, the international community is successful in bringing about fundamental economic restructuring for the region as a whole, then Southeastern Europe may finally enter
into a period of sustainable economic growth. While this is by no means a guarantee against
future Balkan crises, regional economic stability and renewed cooperation will enhance the
likelihood of lasting peace in the region.
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